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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIELLE LeBOUTHILLIER, and 
DENISE, GISELE, VICTOR and 
SUSANNE LeBOUTHILLIER, 
minors, by their Gaurdian ad litem, 
ELAINE K. WOOD, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
GLORIA OLIVER, 
Plaintf f and Appellant, 
vs. 
SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
PETER KIEWIT CONSTRUCTION 
CO., MORRISON-KNUDSON, INC., 
and MID-VALLEY, INC., doing 
business as ARCH DAM 
CONSTRUCTORS, 
Third Party Defendants 
and Repondents. 
Case No. 
10363 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellants have prosecuted this appeal from 
an adverse jury verdict on special interrogatories 
and judgment thereon denying them recovery for 
wrongful death as surviving heirs of two workmen 
killed as the result of a crane accident at Flaming 
Gorge, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Appellant Marielle LeBothillier, wife of For-
1 
tunat LeBouthillier, deceased, filed a wrongful death 
action on her own behalf and as the guardian ad 
litem for her minor children against Shurtleff & 
Andrews, Inc., a Utah corporation, alleging the 
latter's negligence was the cause of her husband's 
death occurring during construction of the dam at 
Flaming Gorge, Utah. Gloria Oliver also filed a 
similar action as the surviving wife of Frank T. 
Oliver. Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., impleaded Arch 
Darn Constructors, a joint venture, consisting of 
Peter Kiewit Construction Co., Morrision-Knudson, 
Inc. and Mid-Valley, Inc., which was the employer 
of both of the deceased. The actions were consoli-
dated for trial. On special interrogatories the trial 
court entered judgment for the respondent, Shurt-
leff & Andrews. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement 
of facts as being a more accurate resume of the 
evidence presented at trial, and more in keeping 
with the rule that on appeal the evidence will be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's ver-
dict. 
On March 29, 1963, Frank T. Oliver and For-
tunat LeBouthillier were killed at the Flaming Gorge 
Dam site near Dutch John, Utah, while assisting in 
putting in a front "outrigger" on a 30-ton Lorraine 
2 
Crane which was in the process of moving a gate on 
top of the dam (R-196).< 1> Both men were employ-
ees of Arch Dam. The crane being used was owned 
by Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., and at the time was 
leased to Arch Dam Constructors ( R-182). Arch 
Dam provided an operator, maintenance crew, and 
serviced the crane (R-218). It charged Shurtleff 
& Andrews for repairs (R-337). The lease between 
Shurtleff & Andrews and Arch Dam was a bare 
rental agreement (R-329, 352, Exh. 27). The lease 
provided: 
" ( 7) The lessee shall keep the equipment in 
good i·epair and condition as when leas-
ed, reasonable wear and tear excepted, 
and 
( 8) The lessee shall be liable for any and all 
damages to any persons or property 
while said equipment is in its posses-
sion." 
The practice of Shurtleff & Andrews was to 
bring the crane out to a construction site and then 
lease the crane to various contractors who needed 
it (R-317-318). Separate leases would usually be 
entered into for each use by a contractor (R-321). 
The crane involved in the instant case was 
first brought to Flaming Gorge in July of 1962 
where it was used by the American Bridge Com-
pany (R-317). It was leased to other persons for 
their use in constructing the Darn during the last 
(1) References to the record are to the Clerk's official paging. 
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part of 1962 (R-317-318). On January 16, 1963, 
the crane was leased to Arch Dam for a little over 
a month ( R-318) . At the time the crane was leased 
to Arch Dam, neither the boom<2> nm· the jib<3> were 
assembled ( R-466). The boom and jib were at-
tached to the crane by employees, iron workers, of 
Arch Dam in January of 1963 (R-469). Thereafter, 
the crane was used by Arch Dam in pouring con-
crete ( R-290). At the time the jib and boom were 
attached, no particular defect was noticed in any 
portion of the jib which connects to the boom. Norm-
ally, if there had been any defect in the jib or boom, 
it would not have been connected ( R-284-285) 
After Arch Dam finished with the use of the 
crane on February 17, 1963, it was parked ad-
jacent to the dam site. On March 19, 1963, Arch 
Dam again leased the crane on a bare rental agree-
ment (R-319, 352). The crane had been inspected 
prior to being sent out to the dam site, and employ-
ees of Arch Dam who were familiar with the Shurt-
leff & Andrews equipment also were instructed to 
inspect the equipment ( R-322-323). 
During the period between Arch Dam's first 
leasing of the crane until the second lease on March 
19, the crane was only used a few hours by Oberg 
Electric Company (R-319). 
Arch Dam used the crane from March 20, 1963 
until the day of the accident on March 29, 1963 
(2) The first long arm of the crane coming from the crane caib area. 
( 3) A second smaller appendage attached to the boom. 
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(R-317). On March 29, the boom on the crane was 
being used to make a very heavy "pick" or move 
of about 20 tons ( R-280). The boom alone was be-
ing used in aid of the move ( R-235-240), but the jib 
was attached. Gerald Twitchell, an Arch Dam em-
ployee, was assigned by his superior to make the 
"pick". He had never operated the crane before and 
was unfamiliar with a special "power down" lever 
which was controlled by a special gear arrangement 
(R-237, 255, 280) which permitted the "whip 
line"<4) to be lowered under powe1· rather than by 
gravity. Mr. Twitchell used the power down lever 
in moving approximately 500 pounds of steel with 
the "'whip line" immediately prior to making the 
heavy "pick" (R-238). A forward movement of 
this power lever caused the "whip line" to be "sucked 
in" and the headache ball(5) to raise (R-254). A 
backward movement of the same lever caused the 
"'load line"(6) to lower. Manual centering of this 
power lever was required and if left in a position 
slightly forward of center, it would cause the drum 
to which the whip line is attached, to turn, thus 
causing the line to be "sucked in" and the headache 
ball to raise ( R-254) . According to Twitchell, he 
had completed the heavy "pick" when suddenly .the 
(4) A steel load ca'ble attached to the "headache ball" which operates 
over the sheave point of the jib and used for light lifts. 
(5) An 80 pound steel ball attached to the steel cable which runs over 
the s·heave point of the jib and acts as a counterweight. 
( 6) A seveml part steel cable attached to the load block which 
operates over the sheave point of the lboom and used for heavy 
lifts. 
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pendent lines went limp and the jib went back 
against the boom and fell off to the right (R-247, 
209), struck the crane cab and then fell onto Oliver 
and LeBouthillier. All witnesses seemed to agree 
that the boom was operating at an angle of about 
70° in making the pick and that the jib came al-
most straight back (R-210, 247). No safety line 
was installed on the crane although Arch Dam in-
stalled safety or belly lines on almost all the rest 
of its cranes either before or after the accident 
(R-216, 217), and could have done so on the Shurt-
leff & Andrews crane had it wished to do so, it 
being a minor job (R-216). 
The day of the actident was a clear day with 
occasional gusts of wind which were described as 
moderate ( R-248), although no one noticed any 
particular effect of any wind on the crane or at the 
time of the accident ( R-248, 212). 
William Barnes, an employee of Arch Dam, 
who was seated in another crane some 500 feet dis-
tant from Twitchell, with his view uninmpaired, 
testified that he saw the headache ball come up 
against the jib and pull the jib backward before it 
fell, at which time he exclaimed that Twitchell has 
"pulled the jib back", since the ball would have 
had to come up to the jib under power (R-491). 
Other employees had doubt as to Twitchell's fami-
liarity with the crane (R-476). Barnes said that 
the jib could be pulled backwards if the power lever 
controlling the whip line was not manually centered, 
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and if power were applied, bringing the headache 
ball up against the jib ( R-500). 
Subsequent to the accident, it was noted that 
the area where the jib attaches to the boom was 
worn and elongated ( R-199). One employee of 
Shurtleff & Andrews inspected the crane after 
March 13, 1963, to make certain the pins and cotter 
keys were in place and found no defect in the crane 
( R-520). It was the practice of Arch Dam employ-
ees to inspect the crane before each use. 
The plaintiff's experts testified the elongation 
would weaken the jib and could subject it to failure 
by ~1inds of 25 miles per hour velocity ( R-421, 
422). No evidence was offered concerning the wind 
velocity on the day in question. 
Defendant's expert was of the opinion the elong-
ation would have no effect upon the crane coming 
over backwards ( R-343) . 
There was no evidence as to when the elonga-
tion occurred, and evidence was offered which in-
dicated it could have occurred after the crane was 
leased and delivered to Arch Dam on the 19th of 
March, 1963 (R. 374-376). 
The case was submitted to the jury on special 
interrogatories, and based thereon, the Court enter-
ed judgment in favor of respondent and against ap-
pellants. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW BASED ON THE 
INTERROGATORIES AS ANSWERED BY THE JURY. 
The appellants contend that they are entitled 
to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. The 
essence of their argument is that since the jury 
found Arch Dam Constructors were negligent in 
failing to remove the boom and jib from the crane 
and inspect the crane and also found such conduct 
was the proximate cause of the accident, that in 
also finding the failure of Shurtleff & Andrews to 
inspect the crane prior to delivery, the Jury must 
have found the same negligence was involved, and, 
the ref ore, Shurtleff & Andrews' negligence must 
also have been a proximate cause of the accident. 
The jury however found the negligence of Shurtleff 
& Andrews not to have been a proximate cause of 
the accident (R. 88, 89). 
It is submitted that the appellants' argument 
does not necessarily follow. In Schweitzer v. Stone, 
13 Utah 2d 199, 371 P.2d 201 ( 1962), Justice Crock-
ett stated the general rule in a dissenting opinion: 
"It is universally recogfiized that whenever 
there is doubt or uncertainty, it must be re-
solved in favor of the validity of the verdict 
and the judgment. The specific application of 
that principle here requires that the q_ues-
tions put to the jury and the answers given 
be reconciled as consistent with each other 
8 
if that reasonably can be done, and that they 
not be interpreted as inconsistent or contra-
dict01·y unless that is the only reasonable con-
clusion to be drawn therefrom." ( 13 Utah 
2d 207) 
As early as TVarner v. United States Mutual 
Accident Ass'n., 8 Utah 431, 32 Pac. 696 ( 1893), 
this Court indicated that a construction should be 
given to a jury's answers which is consistent with 
the evidence and the law if it is at all possible. 
It is submitted that the jury's findings are 
reconcilable with both the evidence and the law. 
The error in the appellants' position is the fail~ 
ure to recognize that the jury could have found that 
although Shurtleff & Andrews may have been negli-
gent in not sufficiently inspecting the crane prior 
to delivery to Arch Dam, the defect causing the 
accident would not have been discovered at that 
time and, in fact, arose after the delivery. In that 
event, the failure of respondent to inspect could 
not have been the proximate cause of the injury, 
since inspection would not have given the respon-
dent notice of any defect then in existence which, 
if corrected, would have prevented the accident. 
The appellants' theory of the liability appeared 
to be based upon the contention that the elongated 
holes in the connection of the jib and boom would 
cause sufficient weakness in the connection that 
a small wind force would bring the jib down. How-
ever, the evidence was conflicting and speculative 
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as to when the elongation occurred. The elongation 
was not observed at the time the jib was attached 
to the boom. For several days immediately preced-
ing the accident, Arch Dam had been using the 
crane to pour cement which was an admittedly heavy 
use and, according to one witness, could have caused 
the elongation (R. 290). Therefore, the variance of 
time when the damage occurred which caused the 
accident and the time when respondents had a duty 
to inspect compared to when Arch Dam had a duty 
to inspect renders the jury's verdict consistent. 
In Prosser, Torts, 3rd Ed., p. 309, speaking of 
intervening cause, it is stated: 
"An intervening cause is one which comes 
into active operation in producing the result 
after the negligence of the defendant." 
As noted in the Restatement of Torts, 2nd § 
433 ( c) , the "lapse of time" between the negligence 
and the result, may because of a great many other 
factors have intervened as contributing causes, 
make the actor's conduct so ~'attenuated as to be 
insignificant". In such cases, there is no legal caus-
ation. 
The Restatement of Torts, 2nd Ed., § 441 (1), 
comments on "intervening force": 
"An intervening force is one which actively 
operates in producing harm to another after 
the actor's negligent act or omission has been 
committed.'' 
Of importance in determining causation is the 
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question of whether the intervening factor operates 
"independently" of the original actor's negligence. 
In this case, it is apparent that if the jury deter-
mined from the evidence that the physical factor 
which caused the accident occurred after the time 
respondent had a duty to inspect and after delivery 
to Arch Dam, then obviously the occurrence of the 
factor subsequent in time and independent of the 
negligence of respondent would be an intervening 
cause. The jury would therefore be consistent in 
finding that although both Arch Dam and respon-
dent may have been guilty of negHgence in failing 
to inspect, that since the physical factor causing 
the injury occurred after respondent's duty to in-
spect terminated and while Arch Dam still had such 
a duty, Arch Darn's negligence of a form similar 
to that of respondent would have been the proximate 
cause of the injury while not so that of respondent's. 
Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 P.2d 
639 ( 1943), relied on by the appellants, is not in 
harmony with the facts the jury could have found 
in this case and does not provide any basis for re-
versal. In that case, the dangerous condition of the 
boiler existed prior to the time the original actor de-
livered the control over the boiler to the other party. 
In this case, the jury could find that the dangerous 
condition did not occur until after control of the 
crane had passed to Arch Dam. In Ehalt, this Court 
observed: 
"'An independent intervening agent such as 
11 
to break the casual connection between right 
and wrong according to Bohlen on Torts, page 
29, must be ( 1) independent, self created, not 
itself the product of the wrongful act; (2) 
it must intervene; (3) 'It must divert and 
not merely hasten natural effect of the 
wrong.'" (104 Utah 126) 
Clearly, if the defect in the crane(7) occurred 
subsequent to the negligence of respondent and not 
as a result of respondent's actions, the elements 
for an intervening cause have been satisfied, hence 
Ehalt would support the jury's verdict in this case. 
Cf. Encyclopedia of Negligence, Vol. 1, § 100. 
A case very similar to the instant one is Hook 
v. National Brick Conipany, 150 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 
1945). The plaintiff sued for wrongful death when 
her husband was struck and killed during a brick 
loading operation in which a crane was used. Plain-
tiff relied on the following acts of negligence: 
"* * * ' ... that defendant (1) failed to in-
spect the cables on the crane, knowing that 
they had been used beyond their capacity by 
the North Pier Terminal Company; (2) per-
mitted the cables to become stretched so that 
the box would not be lifted evenly, thereby 
causing the box to swerve toward and strike 
the decedent; and (3) failed to maintain the 
crane and cables in a condition of repair 
sufficient to prevent injury to decedent, in 
view of all the circumstances, including the 
fact that defendant knew or should have 
known that the cables would become stretched 
(7) Assuming such was in fact a cause. 
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and the hooks at the end of the cables bent 
because of the use of the equipment by the 
North Pier Terminal Company in storing ma-
terial heavier than the capacity load of the 
crane and cables. * * *' " ( 150 F.2d 186). 
In reversing a judgment for plaintiff, the Court ob-
served there was insufficient evidence to show when 
the alleged stretching in the cables, if any, occurred. 
The Court noted : 
" '* * * What, if anything, an inspection 
would have disclosed under such circumstanc-
es is purely a matter of conjecture. As pointed 
out by defendant, it is just as reasonable to 
infer that an inspection would have revealed 
the cables in good condition as that it would 
have revealed a defective condition.' 
* * * 
" 'A failure to make an inspection does not 
create liability unless the inspection, if made, 
would have disclosed the particular defect 
which makes the use harmful to the other. 
* * *'" (150 F.2d 187) 
Therefore, in this case, the jury could have 
found that at the time the respondent had a duty 
to inspect, the inspection would not have revealed 
any defect, hence no liability because the failure to 
inspect was not a cause of the acciderit. 
In 8 C.J.S., Bailments, § 40, p. 479, it is stated: 
"In the absence of notice, the bailor is not 
liable for injuries caused by defects arising 
subsequent to the delivery of the property to 
the bailee, unless he has expressly undertaken 
13 
the duty of inspecting and repairing the pro-
perty.'' 
In 12 A.L.R. 77 4, 777, the same rule is acknowl-
edged: 
"Where the owner of a piece of machinery, 
not in its nature dangerous, allows another 
person competent to manage it to take and 
use it, and while in the possession and use of 
such other person it becomes defective and in-
jures a third person, the owner is not liable." 
(Emphasis added) 
Other later annotations: 61 A.L.R. 1336, 
1337; 131 A.L.R. 845, 846. 
The Restatement of Torts, 2nd Ed., § 300, 
Comment c., states: 
"* * * The failure to inspect would be negli-
gent if inspection would have discovered other 
defects which would make the thing unsafe 
for use, but it is not the legal cause of the 
plaintiff's harm unless it would have dis-
closed the particular defect which brought 
about the harm. * * *" 
It is obvious therefore, the jury's findings and 
answers to the interrogatories do not entitle appel-
lants to recover, since the jury could have found 
that at the time respondent had duty to inspect, the 
defect, if any, did not exist, and that the respon-
dent's duty to inspect had terminated when the de-
fect occurred and Arch Dam then had the duty to 
inspect in accordance with the terms of the Bare 
Rental Agreement, and further that the respondent 
was entitled to relyy upon the assumption that the 
14 
duty of Arch Darn to maintain the equipment in 
good repair included inspection adequate to reveal 
the elongation of the holes. 
Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co., 8 Utah 2d 
383, 335 P.2d 619 ( 1959), does not support the ap-
pellants' position. The case did not concern itself 
with the same fact or law context as that now before 
the Court, and further, the Court affirmed the trial 
court's construction of the interrogatories based on 
the trial court's view of the evidence. The Court 
found that there was no evidence to support the 
jury's finding that the plaintiff's negligence was 
not the proximate cause of the accident. It stated: 
"* * * We, however, are of the opinion that 
there was no substantial evidence, nor was 
there any evidence to support the answer to 
Question No. 6. 
"It is immaterial whether or not the answer 
to Question VI be considered inconsistent 
with the answer to Question V. Neither was 
inconsistent with any general verdict and Rule 
49 (b) has no application. The questions were 
submitted under Rule 4 9 (a) . 
"There is no evidence that plaintiff's negli-
gence was not a proximate cause of his in-
jury. No inference can be drawn from the 
evidence that plaintiff's negligence did not 
proximately contribute to his injury. 
"The only logical inference available to us 
is that his negligence was a proximate cause 
of his injury. 
"The determination of proximate cause is not 
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a pure fact question, it is largely a conclusion 
available from the facts adduced." (8 Utah 
2d 386). 
In this case, there is ample evidence to sustain 
the jury's determination that the defect in the crane 
.occurred subsequent to when respondent delivered 
the crane over to Arch Dam. 
Additionally, it should be noted that what the 
jury found was negligence on the part of respon-
dent and Arch Dam, but that respondent's negli-
gence was not the proximate cause of the accident. 
Respondent's theory of the case was that the crane 
operator pulled the jib over because of improper 
operation and lack of familiarity with the crane. 
There was ample evidence to support this conclu-
sion (R. 476, 490-500). The Court gave instruc-
tions to the jury on this theory (Instructions 15, 
17, 20, 22 and 28). The interrogatories submitted 
to the jury did not clearly apprise the jury of the 
of the respondent's theory. Respondent excepted 
to the interrogatories although appellants did not 
(R. 550). 
In Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 
273 ( 1952), this Court observed: 
"* * * Wherever there is uncertainty or 
doubt in connection with the correlation of 
interrogatories with each other and their an-
swers, they should be so interpreted as to har-
monize with the findings of the jury if that 
can reasonably be done. * * *" ( 122 Utah 
146) 
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The jury could well have found that the crane 
operators negligence was a substantial intervening 
act which caused the accident. This is not inconsis-
tent with the finding that Arch Dam's negligence 
in failing to inspect was also a cause since the jury 
could have found (a) the negligence of the crane 
operator the major cause, (b) the negligence of 
Arch Dam a minor cause, ( c) the negligence of 
respondent so insubstantial as to be negligible and 
thus no cause, Restatement of Torts, 2nd Ed., § 
431, Comment b. Thus, in so construing the evidence 
and the interrogatories, the verdict is proper, Pace 
v. Parrish, supra. 
Finally, it should be noted that in any event 
appellants would not be entitled to judgment as 
matter of law since respondent took substantial ob-
jection and exception at trial which would require 
review in its own right. Additionally, respondent 
should have its rights over against Arch Dam, 
Sanone v. J. C. Penney Co., Utah Sup. Ct. No. 
10047, July 22, 1965. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN REFUSING APPELLANTS' INSTRUCTIONS ON 
WARRANTY. 
The appellant argues that the trial court should 
have given an instruction on the theory of an implied 
warranty of fitness for purpose. In support of its 
claim for implied warranty, the appellant relies 
upon Acme Crane Rental Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 
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14 Utah 2d 300, 383 P.2d 487 ( 1963). It is sub-
mitted there is no merit to this contention. The Acme 
Crane case dealt solely with the liability between 
the lessee and the lessor for the failure of the equip-
ment to perform, thus damaging the lessee. Nothing 
in the case supports a proposition that remote third 
parties may have such a cause of action against the 
lessor for personal injuries. 
The complaints filed in the instant case and 
the warranties relied on by the plaintiffs appear 
to have been those under the Sales Act, 60-1-15 
U.C.A., 1953, rather than that applicable to an 
equipment lease, and although some of the language 
applicable to a complaint under the one theory may 
be applicable to the other, in substance, they are 
entirely unrelated. Since there was no sale involved, 
the Sales Act warranties would not be applicable, 
Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints 
Hospital, 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961). 
That the bailment warranty is not comparable 
to the sales warranty is clear from the statement in 
12 A.L.R. 77 4: 
"In the class of cases under consideration, the 
courts have apparently sometimes used the 
term 'implied warranty' without careful con-
sideration of its exact meaning and effect. If 
the term is used in its ordinary signification, 
it would seem that if there is an 'implied war-
ranty' on the part of the bailor regarding the 
soundness or fitness of the subject-matter ~f 
the bailment, all considerations as to negh-
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gence or care on his part are immaterial. But 
while some courts may perhaps take this view, 
the majority of the courts do not seemingly 
use the term in the broad sense of an abso-
lute warranty. The 'implied warranty' may, 
it is suggested, be a warranty against certain 
elements or conditions which do not ordin-
arily occur without negligence on the part of 
the bailor, precluding consideration of negli-
gence in the particular case. But the cases 
do not support the doctrine that there is an 
'implied wraranty' of freedom from defects, 
or of fitness of the subject-mater on the part 
of the bailor so as to make him an insurer 
against injury to the bailee under all cor-
cumstances, without respect to the nature of 
the defects in the property bailed. The 'im-
plied warranty,' if it can properly be said to 
exist at all, seems limited to certain circum-
stances, and beyond these the courts have con-
sidered the question of liability as depending 
on the care or negligence of the bailor." 
Later, in 131 A.L.R. 845, it is observed: 
"Although in some of the later decisions, as 
in some of the cases set out in the earlier anno-
tations, the courts, in passing upon the li-
ability of the bailor for hire for personal in-
jury or death have referred to the 'implied 
warranty' of the bailor that the subject mat-
ter of the bailment is fit for its known in-
tended use, the term has seldom, if ever, been 
used in its true sense as denoting insurance 
of the fitness of the subject of the bailment." 
(Emphasis added) 
In McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d 740, 255 
P.2d 810 ( 1953), the California Supreme Court 
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noted that where a theory of negligence and war-
ranty in a bailment situation involved a failure to 
inspect the same proof was involved. It noted: 
"Paul McNeal rented a tractor from Samuel 
Greenberg and two other persons doing busi-
ness as copartners under the name of Sam's 
U-Drive. When operating the vehicle McNeal 
sustained personal injuries and sued the les-
sors for damages. The appeal is from a judg-
ment entered upon a directed verdict in favor 
of the lessors. 
" ( 1) In the first count of the complaint it 
is charged that the lessors negligently failed 
to make a proper test or inspection of the 
tractor before renting it to McNeal. As a 
result of such failure, it is alleged, he re-
ceived the vehicle in a dangerous and defec-
tive condition. Section 408 of the Restatement 
of the Law of Torts, quoted with approval in 
Rae v. California Equipment Co., 12 Cal.2d 
563, 569, 86 P.2d 352, declares that a bailor 
for hire of a chattel must use reasonable care 
to make it safe for its intended use or dis-
close its actual condition to the bailee. 
" ( 2, 3) In comment 'a' under that section 
it is said: 
'The fact that a chattel is leased for im-
mediate use makes it unreasonable for 
the lessor to expect that the lessee will 
do more than give it the most cursory of 
inspections. The lessor must, therefore, 
realize that the safe use of the chattel 
can be secured only by precautions taken 
by him before turning it over to the les-
see. * * * If the chattel is made by a 
third person, the lessor is required to ex-
20 
ercise reasonable care to inspect it before 
turning it over to the lessee. * * * In 
addition to the inspection required when 
the chattel is acquired, the lessor is re-
quired to make from time to time such 
inspections of the articles, which he keeps 
for hire, as a reasonably careful man 
would make in view of the nature of the 
article and the use to which it is to be 
put.' 
"The second count of the complaint is based 
upon the theory of a breach of an implied 
warranty of fitness. It is alleged that the 
lessors warranted the tractor to be fit for the 
purpose for which it was hired and that Mc-
N eal accepted it in reliance upon such war-
ranty. McN eal asserts that the defective con-
dition of the brakes made the machine unsafe 
and unfit for its contemplated use and caused 
the injuries for which he claims damages. 
" ( 4) A bailor's implied warranty of fitness 
does not make him an insurer against all per-
sonal injuries suffered from the defective op-
eration of the bailed chattel. He impliedly 
warrants only that he has exercised reason-
able care to ascertain that the chattel is safe 
and suitable for the purpose for which it is 
hired. Dam v. Lake Aliso Riding School, 6 
Cal.2d 395, 399-400, 57 P.2d 1315; Kersten 
v. Young, 52 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 125 P.2d 501; 
cf. Miller v. Midway Fishing Tool Co., 106 
Cal. App. 2d 612, 614, 235 P.2d 630; see anno-
tation 12 A.L.R. 774; 61 A.L.R. 1336; 131 
A.L.R. 845. 
"In this count, as in the one based upon the 
theory of negligence, the essential inquiry is 
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whether the Greenbergs made such inspec-
tion of their equipment as was necessary to 
discharge their duty of reasonable care." 
Therefore, the instructions as given adequately 
covered the issue in any event. 
Even so, it is well settled that in a case like 
this one the absence of privity will bar an action. 
In 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bailnients, § 243, p. 1132, it is 
noted: 
". . . the ordinary relationship of bailment 
creates no privity of contract between the 
bailor and a stranger thereto so as to enable 
such third person, if injured, to maintain an 
action against the bail or for damages, based 
on some failure of the latter to any duty under 
lzis contract with the bailee ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
In Eklof v. Waterston, 132 Ore. 479, 285 Pac. 
201 ( 1930), an injured pedestrian brought suit 
against an automobile lessor for injuries sustained 
when lessee ran over her. The Court noted : 
"There was no privity of contract between 
plaintiff and the defendant corporation and, 
hence, any failure by the corporation to per-
form any duty under its contract with the 
bailees will not sustain an action on the con-
tract in favor of plaintiff, and, if plaintiff 
may recover at all, it must be upon some 
other ground than a failure of the defendant 
corporation to perform the duties imposed by 
the contract, for whatever duties the corpora-
tion may owe to the hirers of the automobile, 
it owned no contractual duty whatever to 
plaintiff." (285 Pac. 203) 
The cases cited by the appellants deal with the 
question of privity under the Sales Act not the bail-
ment situation, and are inapplicable in this case. 
Many of the cases cited by appellants deal with spe-
cial products such as food, medicine, etc. See dis-
cussion Restatement of Torts, 2nd Ed., § 402A. It 
has been recognized that abolition of privity is really 
extending strict liability and should be exercised 
where the policy of the law requires strict liability, 
King et al., Commercial Law, Annual Survey of 
American Law 1963, p. 320. Even so, the great 
majority of cases require privity in non-foods cases 
or cases where no special public policy is required. 
In 75 A.L.R. 2d, 46, it is stated: 
"The prevailing (if not the enlightened) view 
as to whether there may be recovery, on the 
theory of breach of warranty, against the 
manufacturer or seller of a product alleged 
to have caused injury, where there is no pri-
vity of contract between the injured person 
and the defendant manufacturer or seller, is 
that this question is to be answered in the 
negative, privity being indispensable to a suc-
cessful warranty action." 
See also, Frumer & Friedman, Prodiwts Li-
ability,§ 16.03 [5]. 
This Court inferred as much in Schneider v. 
Suhnnann, 8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822 (1958). For 
a good analysis and a conclusion requiring warranty, 
see Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 382 P.2d 399 
(Nev. 1963). 
68-3-1 U.C.A., 1953, adopts the common law 
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of England as applicable law in Utah except where 
changed by constitution, statute or inconsistent with 
the natural physical conditions or necessities of the 
people. The requirement of privity existed at com-
mon law and is generally the law now. Necessity has 
not dictated a change and therefore appellants have 
no basis for a claim of error. 
Appellants' contention of express warranty 
must fall for the same reasons. However, it is ap-
parent no express warranty was in fact ever made. 
Appellants rely on the testimony of Max S. An-
drews of Shurtleff & Andrews which was ( R. 322) : 
"Q (By Mr. Draper) When the crane was 
first rented by Arch Dam did Arch Dam ex-
press a particular use that they needed? 
"A They needed a motor crane for general 
crane work. 
"Q Did you indicate to them you would fur-
nish the 35 ton Loraine motor crane for that 
purpose? 
"A I told them what we had. We had a 530W 
crane and that it was available and they re-
quested it." 
Clearly, this does not constitute an express war-
ranty. It does however demonstrate another reason 
why appellants' theory of warranty must fail. 8 
C.J.S., Bailments, § 25, p. 382, states: 
"There is also authority to the effect that t~e 
general rule is limited to bailments which m 
their essence disregard the individual id~nt­
ity of the thing hired, and look only, or chief-
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ly, to the results to be obtained from the use 
of that thing, and that, accordingly, on the 
same theory prevailing in leases of realty, 
there is no implied warranty of reasonable 
fitness or capability for use in the case of a 
bailment for hire of a specific, ascertained 
article, the intended use of which is not an 
element of the contract, as, for example, a 
particular dredge, truck crane." 
Further, Arch Dam had used the crane before 
and knew specifically what it wanted. There is no 
merit to the claim the trial court erred in not giv-
ing an instruction on warranties. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED ON 
APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE 
DOCTRINE OF LOANED SERVANT. 
The appellants contend the trial court should 
have given their requested instructions on the theory 
that Theron Holmes and LaMonte C. Pilling were 
not loaned employees of Shurtleff & Andrews, but 
still employees of Shurtleff & Andrews or least em-
ployees of both Arch Dam and Shurtleff & Andrews. 
The basis of the appellants' claim of error is the 
contention that Holmes and Pilling connected the 
jib to the boom, and therefore, the jury could have 
found they were negligent in failing to notice any 
defect in the crane that may have existed at that 
time if any did exist, and that that negligence could 
be imputed to Shurtleff & Andrews. 
Contrary to the bold and erroneous assertion 
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in appellant's brief, Holmes and Pilling did not 
connect the boom to the jib. The actual assembly 
of the boom and jib was performed by a crew of 
Arch Dam iron workers under the direction of one 
Ray Bossa. Thus, the testimony of Mr. Pilling which 
is not only uncontradicted, but corroborated by 
Holmes and one other witness, was as follows (R. 
469-470): 
"Q All right. ¥/ill you indicate what you -
who was with you as you recall? 
"A My oiler and I went over and moved the 
machine over on the dam. That was T. C. 
Holmes. 
"Q He was your oiler, 
"A That's right. 
"Q Did he drive the truck onto the dam, 
"A y . es, sir. 
"Q And you operated the crane portion? 
''A That's true. 
"Q All right. Now, tell me what happened 
after that? Do you recall who - anybody of 
the iron workers? 
"A Well, we moved the machine on the dam 
and the sections of boom. The jib was there 
when we assembled the boom and -
"Q \Vhen you say -
"A Assembled the boom. They assembled the 
boom. I sat in the machine. There has to be 
someone -
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"Q \Vhen you say they who do you have 
reference to? 
"A Ironworkers. 
"Q Do you recall who the foreman of the 
ironworkers was? 
"A Yes, sir. Ray Bossa. 
"Q Now, during the time this was being 
assembled you said you were in the crane cab; 
is that correct? 
"A That's right. 
"Q And who inserted the pins in the various 
boom sections? 
"A Well, it could have been any member of 
that crew. Now I don't remember exactly 
which one it would be. 
"Q Someone in the ironworkers crew? 
"A That's right. Some in the ironworkers 
crew. 
"Q And was the jib put on at the same time? 
"A y . es, sir. 
"Q And how was that assembled? 
"A \Vell, the general procedure, of course, 
is not always that way, but this particular 
time the jib was laid on the ground upon a 
block to raise the connected side high enough 
to back the lower boom into position. 
"Q Who backed the lower section in? 
"A Well, the oiler would have to. He was 
in the cab of the truck portion. 
"Q You mean the boom section was lying 
this way (indicating) and the jib section was 
on blocks? 
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"A On blocks." 
Holmes testified to the same effect that other 
Arch Dam employees actually assembled the boom 
and jib (R. 287). 
Therefore, the basic premise of appellants is 
factually faulty. Since the two persons actually men-
tioned in the instructions did not assemble the crane 
' they could not have seen any elongation at that time 
and negligence could not be charged to them. 
Further, a reading of the instructions shows 
they are not properly definitive of the state of the 
law, and in several instances were argumentive and 
overly accentuated the plaintiffs' position thus war-
ranting their rejection. 
Finally, it is submitted the facts of the case 
do not support the requirement that the Court give 
such instructions. Holmes testified that he was on 
Arch Dam's payroll and was their employee. He had 
not worked for Shurtleff & Andrews for some time 
or been paid by them. He did the work that Arch 
Dam foreman directed him to do, and attended meet-
ings held for their employees (R. 288). Ray Bossa, 
an employee of Arch Dam, was acting as Holmes' 
foreman. No one from Shurtleff & Andrews gave ' 
them any instructions or exercised any control. 
Arch Dam had the power to hire and fire (R. 288). 
The agreement between Arch Dam and Shurt-
leff & Andrews was a bare rental contract. It did 
not call for the the furnishing of an operator. Arch 
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Dam took over the crane completely, and provided 
the operator and maintenance (R. 218, 337, 352, 
Ex. 27). At the time of the accident, the crane was 
being operated by Gerald Twitchell, an employee of 
Arch Dam ( R. 235-240). LaMonte Pilling was also 
an employee for Arch Dam under the supervision 
of Mr. Carlberg or another Arch Dam supervisor 
( R. 466). Arch Dam con trolled where he would 
work, when, and on what jobs ( R. 466). During 
lulls in the work, they did not return to Shurtleff 
& Andrews, nor were they sent out to the job site 
by respondent. Further, the employees operated 
equipment other than that supplied by Shurtleff & 
Andrews ( R. 465) . 
It is apparent that under the decision of Bad-
ertscher v. Independent Ice Co., 55 Utah 100, 184 
Pac. 181 (1919), the employees in question were 
employees of Arch Dam. Further, under the stan-
dard of a "loaned employee", Arch Dam was ex-
clusively exercising control and solely responsible 
for their conduct, 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant, 
§ 18. The factors important in determining the 
master-servant relationship are all against the ap-
pellants' contention, Restatement of Agency, 2nd 
Ed., § 227 Comment C and Illustration 4. 
Unde1· such facts, numerous cases have held 
that crane operators were not employees of the crane 
lessor, Truitt v. B & G Crane Service, Inc. 165 
So.2d 874 (La. App.); Kessler v. Bates & Rogers 
Constr. Co., 155 Neb. 40, 50 N.W.2d 553; J.l1odern 
29 
Electric Co. v. Dennis, 259 N.C. 354, 130 S.E.2d 
547; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Henry J. Spieker 
Co., 103 Ohio App. 455, 146 N.E.2d 138; Western 
Marine & Salvage Co. v. Ball, 37 F.2d 1004 (D.C. 
Cir. 1930) Cert. denied 281 U.S. 7 49; Errickson v. 
F. W. Schwiers, Jr. Co., 108 N.J.L. 481, 158 At!. 
482 ( 1932) ; Annotation 17 A.L.R. 2d 1448. 
The trial judge acted properly in refusing the 
appellants' requested instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in the instant case was fully and 
fairly presented and developed. The plaintiffs had 
every opportunity to convince the jury of the de-
fendant's liability. The jury found none. The evi-
dence adequately supports the jury's verdict, and 
therefore p1·ovides no basis for the appellants' major 
claim. The other assignments of error are for many 
legal reasons without merit and offer no basis for 
reversal. This Court should af firrn. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Third 
Party Plaintif !-Respondent 
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